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Abstract
Playing multiple games simultaneously is popular, but we hardly
know how people act in this situation to reach mutual cooperation in
the long run. To answer the question, we conduct a series of exper-
iments on multi-game contact. The results indicate that the number
of information sets in the stage game and the payoff structure are im-
portant. We find that for making mutual cooperation subjects employ
two types of TFT strategies, which simplify the complicated contact.
In these strategies, they avoid separating behavior such as cooparating
in one game but deviating in the other. This makes it easy for the
opponents to understand thier cooperative intention.
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1 Introduction
It is not enough to examine the strategies of the firms in a single game
because a lot of large firms compete or collude with each other in multiple
markets. Toyota has been a multimarket rival of GM in the American and
the Euro markets. Sony has been in competition with Nintendo in the
portable game market (PSP vs. NDS) as well as in the home video-game
console market (PS3 vs. Wii).
Multimarket contact has been investigated empirically since 1950’s [8, 19]
to answer the belief that the increase in the number of market contacts
facilitates collusion. However, empirical support for this belief is not widely
observed, because a lot of market conditions affect empirical data.
We can see multimarket contact generally in a society.1 A wife and
her husband face with cooking and cleaning. A person chooses whether
she hangs around with her colleagues in her private time. The relationship
between political and economic issues is discussed simultaneously in the
diplomatic negotiation. When agents keep on making contact in multiple
situations (markets, jobs, and places), we call this phenomenon ‘multi-game
contact’, since the multi-game contact has a broader meaning than the mul-
timarket contact.
Bernheim and Whinston [3] theorized firms’ multi-game behavior. The
basic theory assumes that two risk neutral agents face with each other in two
infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games. The payoff structure
may be the same or different between two games. They proved that the
combination of different games brought cooperation easily because the lowest
discount factor of multiple games to make mutual cooperation an equilibrium
was lower than that of the single game which is more difficult to cooperate.
Spagnolo [25] proved that if a player had a strictly concave utility, playing
two identical PD games strictly facilitated mutual cooperation more than
playing the same games separately. Aoki [1] utilized this theory to consider
the situation that irrigation in an agricultural village was linked to social
exchange. Iwanari et al. [14] applied this into a trade issue.
Once a theory is established, it must be validated. Since the multi-game
contact theory is a variation of repeated game theory, conducting experiment
is one of the suitable tests. However, few studies have validated basic multi-
game theory up to now. 2
1We assume that multimarket contact is a synchronic phenomenon. A study [24] in
social psychology assumes that multimarket contact is a diachronic phenomenon where
agents interact with each other in a PD game first and then in a public goods game.
2There are numerous studies on the experimental single markets. See [7] and [15]
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On the other hand, the examination of the decision making under multi-
game contact is so important that the analysis result is useful to expect what
happens in the real multi-game contact and to build an economic policy
in the contact. However, the analysis for the multi-game behavior is few.
Under this situation, players can choose more complicated strategies than
under a single-game contact. Detailed analysis of the decision making may
find a new strategy generally used in the real multi-game contact. However,
experimental studies on multi-game contact ignore the behavioral analysis.
Our purpose is to clarify the human behavior under the multi-game
contact with simple PD games; first, we examine the percent cooperation
difference between under the multi-game contact and the single game contact
and within under the multi-game contact to validate the effect of the multi-
game contact in the long run. Second, we dig into the property of the human
behavior under this contact and the strategy for mutual cooperation.
We have three experimental results. First, when in the long run multi-
game contact the percent cooperation is affected by the payoff structure
difference and the number of information sets in the stage game. This is
not found in the prior experimental studies on the multi-game contact but
differs from the theoretical prediction. Second, some of the subjects employ
three types of Tit For Tat strategies. Two of these strategies regard the
opponent’s alternatives in the last round as simply cooperation or deviation
and return cooperation or deviation in all the games in the present round.
Third, they combine one of two strategies and another strategy and send a
message to their opponent for mutual cooperation.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces prior
theories and experiments on the multi-game contact. Section 3 explains
our experimental design with reference to the prior theories and experi-
ments. Section 3.2 introduces some new concepts required for investigating
our experimental results and defines various possible strategies used by the
subjects. In Section 5, we interpret the reason why participants utilize TFT
strategies. In Section 6, we discuss that the strategies from various view-
points. Finally we conclude this paper and refer to our further study.
2 Literature survey
2.1 Theory
Let us introduce prior theoretical studies on multi-game contact. For ex-
ample, Ohta and Kobayashi [16] examines the value of information under
multi-game contact. Matsushima [17] investigates imperfect monitoring un-
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der multi-game contact. Hashimoto [13] utilizes evolutionary game theory
and examine multi-game contact and finds chaotic phenomenon. However,
the aims of these studies are different from our aim.
Price formation and the possibility of collusion in multi-game contact was
first theorized by Bernheim and Whinston ( [3] hereafter B&W) Although,
price formation, quantity choice, Research and Development activity and
entry and exit under multi-game contact have been examined empirically
since 1950’s [8, 4], B&W regarded the situation as infinitely repeated PD
games and assumed that agents had an identical risk neutral utility func-
tion. Then they compared a situation where players played a game T (Table
2) with a situation where they played game S (Table 1) and T simultane-
ously. They showed that playing multiple games simultaneously decreased
the minimum value of discount factor for cooperation with respect to the
one when playing a single game and that playing two identical games did
not promote or prevent cooperation.
Spagnolo ([25]) assumed that agents had strictly concave function U(
∑
xi),
where xi is payoff from game i and U ′() > 0, U ′′() < 0, and following two
trigger strategies. First, players deviate only in the game where their op-
ponent deviated. We call the situation in which this is utilized, “separate
multi-game contact”, because players ignore the connection between games
and act as if they play a single game. Second, players offer “D” in all the
games even if their opponent deviated only in one of the games. We call the
situation in which this is utilized, “pooling multi-game contact”, because
players consider the decision results in all the games.
Then Spagnolo compared the separate multi-game contact with the pool-
ing multi-game contact and showed that the former discount factor was
larger than the latter one.
Spagnolo asserted that two identical games in the separate multi-game
contact was more difficult for mutual cooperation than two identical games
in the pooling multi-game contact, although his result seemingly indicated
that playing two identical games facilitated mutual cooperation more than
playing a single game.
Furthermore, although Spagnolo did not refer apparently, additionally
assuming that u() is a homogeneous function of degree k, we can easily show
that the minimum discount factor in the pooling multi-game when playing
two identical games is as large as the one when playing the same game.
Spagnolo [26] defined three relations;‘not pooling relation’, ‘pooling re-
lation’ and ‘strictly pooling relation’. First is satisfied when agents face
a different agent in each relation. Second is satisfied when the same two
agents face with each other in two games. Third is satisfied when they face
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each other in two games, and when in equilibrium agents choose the same
actions in the two relations. First, second, and third relations are single mar-
ket contact, separate multi-game contact, and pooling multi-game contact,
respectively.
The point of view that the pooling multi-game contact is different from
the separate multi-game contact condition is important but not found in
B&W.3 This view indicates that if agents face with each other in multiple
situations and want to reach mutual cooperation, they have to adopt the
strategy that connects a game and the other game. As section 4 indicates,
the decision whether a player links a game and the other game is very
important when we examine the cooperative behavior under the multi-game
contact. Spagnolo suggested the importance of the behavioral analysis in
the multi-game contact.
2.2 Prior Experiments
Feinberg and Sherman [9] utilized 4×4 payoff matrices as price competition
and conducted multi-game contact experiments. The same payoff structure
was used in all of their experiments. The subjects were not informed of the
number of rounds (actually sixteen). They conducted two treatments. First
is multi-game contact; a player played three identical games simultaneously
with her opponent. Second is a single market contact; a player plays three
identical games simultaneously with different three subjects. Through ex-
periments, They found that the average price was higher in the treatment
one than in the treatment two (nine percent significance).
According to view, this study compared treatment T with treatment
TTT. However, it lacks the treatment where players play the two identical
games simultaneously. The number of strategies in the stage game is sixty
four (substantially twenty eight) in the first treatment. The effect of such
numerous alternatives is ambiguous.
Phillips and Mason [20] utilized Cournot duopoly model (two different
22 × 22 payoff matrices) and conducted a single market and a multi-game
treatment. The subjects were not told the number of rounds in the ex-
periment. The treatment consisted of twenty-nine to forty-three rounds.
Experimental results showed that the number of quantities was smaller in
multi-game contact than in the single market contact. They asserted that
experimental results were consistent with B&W’s theory.
However, considering that the number of the rounds may increase the
3In B&W, such a separation is meaningless because of the shape of utility function.
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subjective discount factor, the authors’ conclusion may be different from the
theoretical prediction. It is unclear that the subjective discount factor is in
the theoretically satisfied range. In addition, this study does not examine
the treatment where players play the identical two games. Therefore, it is
unclear that the percent cooperation change is due to the effect of adding
one more game or the effect of the payoff structure of the added one.
Phillips and Mason [21] conducted a version of their past experiment [20].
Since all subjects knew that the game would last at least thirty five rounds
and thereafter it would end with the probability of twenty percent, the
authors controlled the subjective discount factor. They first attained the
same result as their past experiment. Then the effect of the decision makings
in the previous two rounds on the present decision making was analyzed
econometrically. However, the analysis was applied into the pairs’ decision
makings. We can not grasp the individual decision making.
3 Experimental Design and Preparation of Anal-
ysis
3.1 Experimental Design
Tables 1 to 3 show the payoff matrices. From the viewpoint of the discount
factor, game S is the most cooperative. Game T is almost as cooperative as
game T’. As mentioned later, game T’ is related to an information set.
In the experiments, the subjects offer alternatives simultaneously and
independently through a computer console made by z-Tree [12]. In the
single game contact treatment, they offer an alternative from a game. In
multi-game contact treatment, they offer an alternative from each game,
totally two or three alternatives in each round.
Following scheme is used to reduce the difference of monetary reward
among treatments; x×∑10i=1 pii +800, where pii is a payoff randomly drawn
from all the rounds. We draw ten round payoffs in total. The round number
drawn for the reward is common to all the subjects in the same day . In
multi-game contact treatment, the sum of payoffs from all the games are
used for calculation. Finally x means 0.4, 0.2, and 0.13 in the single market
contact, in multi-game contact treatment of two games and of three games,
respectively.
Table 5 indicates the brief summary of the treatments. We conducted
six treatments; S, T, TT, TTT, TT’, and ST. Last four treatments are
multi-game contact. Experiments were conducted at KEEL (Kyoto Sangyo
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University Experimental Economics Laboratory) from June, 2005 to Novem-
ber, 2006. The subjects knew that their opponent was the identical but
anonymous. In the multi-game contact, the subjects chose an alternative
per game. They were not told the number of rounds in advance. We did
not control the subjective discount factor of the subjects. However, in some
treatments, after the experiment was over, we asked them about their ex-
pected number of rounds when they had come to mind at the beginning of
the experiment.
We conduct treatments to investigate the effect of the change in the
number of the information sets in the stage game and the effect of the the
payoff structure change (Fig 1). Since the latter effect is easy to see, we
explain the first effect. In the experiments for sequential decision making, a
subject utilizes a few past choices and results of her opponent and herself.
Especially, the last decision making and result will affect the present decision
of the subject. Thus, it is reasonable that a player makes the present decision
based on the information set that consists of the last round decision makings
by the opponent. Such an information set has many types of the last round
decision makings. One major type is the information set that bundles the
substantially same strategies in the stage game by one strategy.
In treatment TT, because the payoff structures of all the games are iden-
tical, cooperation in one game and deviation in another game is indifferent.
Therefore, in this treatment, there are three information sets; cooperation
in all the games, deviation in all the games, and cooperation in one game
and deviation in another game. On the other hand, in treatment ST (TT’),
the information set in which a player cooperates in game S (T’) and deviates
in game T is different from the set in which she cooperates in game T and
deviates in game S (T’). This treatment has four information sets; coopera-
tion in all the games, deviation in all the games, cooperation in S (T’) and
deviation in B, and cooperation in T and deviation in S (T’). Similarly, the
number of the information sets is four in treatment TTT. There are three
patterns for offering C in a game and D in another two games. This pattern
is one information set. Similarly, there are three patterns for offering D in
a game and C in another two games. This pattern is one information set.
In the experiments, first, we compare the percent cooperation in treat-
ment S with T, in treatment ST with TT’ and in treatment ST (TT’) with
TTT to confirm the payoff structure change in identical information sets
case. Second, comparing the percent cooperation in T with in TT and the
percent cooperation in TT and TTT, we confirm the information set number
change when the payoff structure in each game is identical.
Our experiment is based on B&W and Spagnolo. B&W investigated the
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multi-game contact from the repeated game theory and showed that the
contact weakly facilitated mutual cooperation. We build the experimental
setting according to the iterated game theory and to their theoretical model.
Spagnolo classified the strategies in multi-game contact into two cases 4; the
strategy that a player chose the same alternatives in all the games (pool-
ing strategy) and the strategy that she chose different alternatives in each
game (separate strategy). Then he showed that the former strategy facil-
itates mutual cooperation. We examine whether our subjects utilize some
pooling strategies or separate strategies from their adaptive behavior and if
they utilize pooling ones, we want to know what kind of pooling strategies
they employ.
Furthermore, our experiment considers the problems of prior experi-
ments. First, the prior experiments have the problem of the discount factor
control. Most of them do not control it seriously. 5 However, the reason
why they did not control it is unexplained. To verify the theory, they have
to control the subjective discount factor severely.
In our view, the severe control brings a new problem; we can not examine
the long run behavior of a game. Since we want to investigate the subjects’
sequential and long run behavior, it is better that we do not control the
discount factor severely. In the discount factor controlled experiments, we
might not conduct the large number of rounds.
Moreover, prior experiments examine only the validity of the theory.
They only compare a game from the multi-game contact with the same game
from the single market contact. It is an open question how people behave
in the multi-game contact. To answer this, prior experimental design is
complicated and the subjects’ behavior in multi-game contact is ambiguous.
Finally, prior experimental studies do not explain why the multiple
games are played instead of a large game; following B&W, playing two
2×2 games is identical with playing a 4×4 game. Spagnolo [26] introduced
the notion of ‘linking relation’ and tried to explain the difference between
playing two 2× 2 games simultaneously and playing a 4× 4 game.
Simultaneous play of multiple games is different from playing the large
single game which integrate these games.6 Suppose that a player faces with
game B and another PD game M (Table 4) which consists of very small
4Following B&W, the multi-game contact simply means that agents play games simul-
taneously and always choose the same alternatives in all the games. Therefore, they did
not introduce them. Even if they found them, the risk neutral utility function would make
them ignore the essential difference.
5Related to multi-game contact experiments, [6] controls the discount factor severely.
6This paragraph is based on discussion with Dr. Masumoto.
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payoff. Integrating B and M into one large game and playing the large game
is very different from playing B and M separately and simultaneously. Play
with this large game vanishes the effect of the game M. Since the value of the
payoff structure in the game M is much smaller than game B, integration
weakens the effect of the game M. On the other hand, multi-game play
keeps the effect. Players may utilize the game M to send some message to
their opponent. They may deviate in the game M to punish her previous
deviation. The game M is important in the multi-game cooperation and this
role can not be observed in the large single game.
Integrating two games into a large game brings a new problem that we
can not deal with the emergence of the linkage between games. Analyzing
the linkage of the games is actually very important, when a firm builds a
strategy, when a government deals with foreign affairs, and when people
live with their family. In such situations, first, agents decide whether they
associate a game with the other game or not. Then, they decide whether
they offer the same alternative in each game.
Our advantage is to investigate whether the subjects connect a game
and the other game. This investigation does not need one large game but
multiple small games. With multiple games that consist of 2× 2 strategies,
we can examine whether and how the subjects reach mutual cooperation
and what kind of strategy will bring mutual cooperation.
Therefore, we utilize simple payoff matrices and does not control the dis-
count factor severely. With this setting, we conduct an experiment where
multi-game contact lasts more than seventy rounds and investigate the de-
cision making pattern of the subjects and its consequence.7 Especially we
can elucidate whether the subjects connect a game and the other game.
To investigate the total effect of multi-game contact, we do not compare
a game from multi-game contact treatment with the same game from the
single game contact treatment. Our study is not enough for verification of
multi-game contact theory because the strict control of the discount factor
is not done. As stated in the section 7, we are conducting the experiments
with the strict control of the discount factor.
3.2 Preparation for the analysis
The human behavior in the multi-game contact has not been examined, al-
though such examination will provide an interesting and new insight into the
behavior in the complicated situation. There seems to be two reasons why
7Another method to figure out the decision making process is found in [23].
9
researchers did not consider the multi-game behavior. First reason is that
they thought that players play multiple games separately. Prior experimen-
tal studies only compares the game B from the single market contact with
the game T from multi-game contact. This analysis does not capture the
whole characteristics of the multi-game contact. Moreover, existing theories
do not recognize that the linkage of games affects a subject’s mind.
Second, as the strategy in the multi-game contact is rarely defined, re-
searchers do not have the tool for behavioral analysis. So far, only two
trigger strategies has been proposed by B&W and Spagnolo. Since the
multi-game contact is a complicated situation, human players can adopt a
lot of strategies. Understanding of the human behavior in the multi-game
contact requires the introduction of strategies instead of the trigger strate-
gies, which are not adaptive at all.
We do not consider Hard-Trigger, Soft-Trigger, and Sep-Trigger when
investigating the subjects’ adaptive behavior because the human subjects is
not strongly rational nor programmed player assumed by the game theory
but an adaptive player who can change his or her strategy according to the
opponent’s strategy. It is obvious that TFT strategy is not the sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium but at most one of the Nash equilibria. Notwith-
standing, TFT is important for expression of the adaptive human behavior.
In this paper, we introduce three strategies and four responses in to-
tal.Strategies are based on TFT strategy [2]in the single-game contact. Let
us define Hard-TFT, Soft-TFT, and Sept-TFT. See Tables 6 and 7. Fol-
lowing is Soft-TFT. If an opponent of a player deviated in all the games in
the last round, the player do the same in the present round. Otherwise, the
player cooperate in all the games in the present round. Those who utilize it
classify the opponent’s last alternatives as only cooperation or deviation but
they do not subtilize them. And then, they return cooperation or deviation
in all the games. In this sense, it reduces the subject’s cost for understanding
the opponent’s thought.
Let us explain Hard-TFT. If an opponent of a player deviated at least
one game in the last round, the player offers deviation in all the games in the
present round. Only if the opponent cooperates in all the games in the last
round, the player offers cooperation in all the games in the present round.
Obviously, when the opponent knows that the player is using Hard-TFT, it
is more robust against her exploitation than Soft-TFT. In this situation, as
she understands that her exploitation brings deviation in all the games by
the player, she has little choice to cooperate in all the games. Therefore,
Hard-TFT is theoretically easy to facilitate cooperation. However, like Soft-
TFT, those who utilize it classify the opponent’s last alternatives as only
10
cooperation or deviation but they do not subtilize them. All they have to
choose is all cooperation or all deviation. In this sense, it also reduces the
subject’s cost for understanding the opponent’s thought.
Let us explain Sept-TFT. When players play multiple identical games, it
is defined by the number of the games in which their opponent deviated in
the last round and that where they do so in the present round. Since all the
games are identical, the player do not care which game she should deviate
against her opponent’s last deviation but care that she equalizes the number
of her deviations with the number of the opponent’s last deviations. When
playing two different games, the player chooses the same alternative in each
game as his or her opponent offered in the last round. This simply mimics
the opponent’s last choices. Thus, those who utilize it do not classify the
opponent’s last alternatives. In this sense, it also reduces the subject’s cost
for understanding the opponent’s thought.
When the opponent offered cooperation (deviation) in all the games in
the last round and the player offers the same alternatives according to TFT
strategies, we can not identify decision makings with one of three TFT
strategies. In such a case, first, we go back to the most recent round in
which the player offered a distinguishable TFT strategy. Then we apply
this TFT to the present and indistinctive TFT strategy. When there is not
a distinguishable TFT strategy in the past, we apply three strategies to the
indistinctive offer. Strategies except for TFT strategies that exist between
the indistinctive TFT round and the most recent distinguishable TFT round
are ignored. See Table 8.8
Indeed, this classification is easily applicable for more than three games.
That is, only we have to do is to modify Hard-TFT and Soft-TFT slightly.
Suppose that multimarket contact consists of n games. k-Soft-TFT strategy
is to offer cooperative alternatives in all the games when an opponent of a
player offered cooperative alternatives in k (k < n) games in the previous
round. Similarly, k-Hard-TFT strategy is to offer deviations in all the games
when an opponent of a player offered cooperative alternatives in k (k < n)
games in the previous round. Thus, definition of a strategy in this manner
formulates human behavior with TFT strategies.
Let us explain four responses. When a player offers cooperation in all
the games although his or her opponent deviated in all the games in the last
round, the player’s response is called Unilateral Cooperation (UC). When
a player offer deviation in all the games although her opponent offer coop-
eration in all the games in the last round, the player’s response is called
8
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Unilateral Deviation (UD). When a player offers cooperation in more games
than the opponent did so in the last round, the player’s response is called
Partial Cooperation (PC). A part of PC is included in Soft-TFT. When, a
player deviates in more (not less) games than the opponent did so in the
last round, the player’s response is Partial Deviation (PD).
4 Analysis
4.1 Overall result
We apply the two way analysis of variance with only one observation in each
cell into rounds and treatments. We mainly use first seventy eight rounds
to compare percent cooperation among all the treatments (Table 9). The
statistical result shows that the percentage of cooperation is different among
treatments at one percent significance (Table 10).
First, according to B&W, we briefly examine the percent cooperation
difference. In the first seventy eight rounds, the percent cooperation in
treatment T is significantly higher than that in treatment ST. In the end of
the treatment, the percent cooperation in ST is almost the same as that in
T. The percent cooperation in treatment T is significantly higher than that
in treatment TT.
The questionnaire result indicates that at the beginning of the experi-
ment, the subjects assumed that the experiments consisted of at least fifty
rounds on average. This indicates that the predicted percentage of coop-
eration among games is unchanged if the discount factor is more than 0.3.
Therefore, if we take players’ subjective discount factor into account, the
theoretical prediction is that the difference of percent cooperation among
all the treatments is not significant.
However, our experimental result is different from the theoretical predic-
tion. Unlike the prediction, the number of information sets and/or in the
payoff structure affects mutual cooperation practically.
Second, we examine the percentage of cooperation difference among
treatments in detail. When the number of information sets increases (from
T to TT and from TT to TTT), there is the significant difference (F = 18.8
and F = 177.6). In two information sets case, it is significantly higher in
treatment S than T (F = 35.2). In four information sets case, it is the
highest in treatment ST, then TTT, and TT’ (F = 84.0 in ST vs. TT’,
F = 46.4 in ST vs. TTT and F = 7.84 in TT’ vs. TTT.) Especially, the
percent cooperation in the first thirty nine rounds is significantly higher in
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TTT than in TT’ and that in the last thirty nine rounds is significantly
higher in ST than in TTT. That in ST finally reaches that in TT.
This indicates that the increase in the number of information sets de-
creases the percentage of cooperation. This result differs from the theoretical
prediction. Therefore it suggests that players face with complicated choices
when the number increases.
Here, we make a remark for the difference between the number of games
and the number of information sets. A reader may expect that the percent
cooperation difference is affected by the former not by the latter. Compar-
ison result between TT’ and TTT indicates that in the latter rounds, the
difference in the number of games does not affect the percent cooperation.
In this case, the payoff structure in each game is almost the same. The num-
ber of games is different. The number of information sets is the same. On
the other hand, the percent cooperation in TT is higher than that in TTT.
In this case, the payoff structure in each game is the same. The number of
games is different. The number of information sets is different. Integrating
the first comparison and the second comparison, we find that the number of
information sets is important for the percent cooperation.
At the same time, this result indicates that given the number of infor-
mation sets, the percentage depends on the relatively cooperative game.
Especially, when the number of information sets is four and the multi-game
contact contains a game S, the percentage of cooperation increases. There-
fore, when the increase in the percentage of cooperation is required in the
four information sets case, the payoff structure is more important than the
number of information sets. The percentage of cooperation difference be-
tween TT’ and TTT is not significant in the last thirty nine rounds. This
indicates that when the number of information sets increase from two to
four, adding the same two games as the original game and adding a slightly
different game is almost indifferent for cooperation.
The percentage of cooperation change is divided into the change in the
number of information sets and in the payoff structure. Changing TT to
TT’ and TT to TTT, the percentage of cooperation change is negative. It
is affected by the negative effect of the information set number change and
the ineffective effect of the payoff structure change. Changing ST to TTT,
the percentage of cooperation change is almost zero. It is affected neither
by the negative effect of the change in the number of information sets or
by the ineffective effect of the payoff structure change. Changing TT’ to
ST, the percentage of cooperation change is positive. It is affected only
by the positive effect of the payoff structure change. Changing TT to ST,
the percentage of cooperation change is almost zero in the long run. It is
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affected by the negative effect of the information set number change and the
positive effect of the payoff structure change.
4.2 Behavioral analysis in multi-game contact
To identify the general strategy which helps to reach mutual cooperation in
the multi-game contact, first, we consider the relationship between percent
cooperation and the information sets used in the experiments. Then we
explain how to classify the subjects’ decision makings. Finally, we make it
clear what kind of strategy can reach mutual cooperation.
In this section, a ‘cooperator’ is the subject whose percent cooperation
is more than seventy five percent. The subject whose percent cooperation is
in the range seventy five percent to twenty five percent is a ‘medium player’.
Otherwise, a subject is a ‘deviator’. In most cases, if a player is a cooperator,
her opponent is a cooperator, too.
Let us investigate the evolution of the subjects’ behavior. Table 11 indi-
cates the distribution of asymmetric alternatives (the mixture of cooperation
in one game and deviation in another game). Asymmetric choices mean nei-
ther strictly cooperation or strictly deviation. In the upper part of the Table,
the frequency of such alternatives is significantly smaller in the latter than
in the former rounds except for treatment TT. The lower part of the Table
indicates cooperators’ choices. They tend to avoid asymmetric choices even
in the former rounds. In the latter rounds, this tendency becomes more
salient. Therefore, this Table indicates that even if the subjects can utilize
asymmetric choices, they only use the symmetrical ones.
Then we examine the subjects’ behavior with cluster analysis. The re-
sult9 is shown in Table 12. It indicates that in any treatment, two strategies
are utilized by cooperators; the strategy which consists of mainly Soft-TFT,
and the one which consists of indistinctive TFT strategy (because both sub-
jects agree on mutual cooperation in the initial rounds). The strategy which
consists of mainly Hard-TFT is utilized by a few cooperators. On the other
hand, there is few cooperators who utilize Sept-TFT mainly.10
Most of the subjects who used the indistinctive TFT strategy offer co-
operation throughout the treatment. They successfully reached mutual co-
operation in the initial rounds.
9With JMP, we normalize the subjects’ decision making distribution by standard de-
viation and conduct K−means cluster analysis that changes the distance with sampling
rate. We classify the subjects’ behavior into five clusters.
10In treatment BC, all the Sept-TFT subjects are cooperators, because all of their
opponents utilize Soft-TFT or Hard-TFT.
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Although Soft-TFT is weak against the opponent’s partial exploitation,
it is important that the percent cooperation in the Soft-TFT based cluster is
very high. It is significantly more cooperative than that of single game treat-
ment T (Table 13).Only exception is treatment TT’, although the percent
cooperation in that treatment is higher than that of treatment T.
The reason is that the players in this cluster utilize Hard-TFT. They
counter with the opponent’s exploitation; if a player adopts Soft-TFT but
is exploited by her opponent for some rounds, she can offer Hard-TFT and
stop her opponent’s exploitation. After unilateral exploitation vanishes,
deviation in all the games with each other or partial cooperation may last
in some rounds. In such a case, she utilizes Soft-TFT again and/or UC and
try to reach mutual cooperation. In the experiments, most players in this
cluster utilize such strategies and response and reach mutual cooperation
successfully.
On the other hand, although Hard-TFT is robust against the opponent’s
exploitation, the percentage of cooperation in the Hard-TFT based cluster
is not so high. The reason is that most players in this cluster can uti-
lize all cooperation or all deviation by Hard-TFT, but fail to choose the
strategies and/or resposes that induce cooperation. Players using it may
be misunderstood by their opponent. For example, even if their opponent
wishes cooperation and offers PC, a Hard-TFT player returns deviation in
all the games. In this case, their opponent may think that she does not want
to cooperate or offer cooperative responses or strategies such as UC never
again.
For mutual cooperation a Hard-TFT player needs to choose additional
responses and/or strategies such as UC and Soft-TFT. However, most of
the human players who use the strategy fail to choose them. Tables ??
to ?? suggest that deviators and medium players use PC and Sept-TFT
in order to reach mutual cooperation. These are only a halfway solution to
mutual cooperation.11 In this experiments, most of the players in Hard-TFT
cluster fail to reach mutual cooperation. This comes from the inappropriate
combination of a strategy and a response.
However, Hard-TFT cluster can still bring mutual cooperation. Those
who reach mutual cooperation successfully in this cluster utilize Hard-TFT
mainly and other cooperative strategies and responses such as Soft-TFT
and UC. Although the percentage of such subjects is not large, the fact that
cooperators exist in this cluster indicates that this cluster can bring mutual




These analysis indicates that cooperators utilize Soft-TFT (Hard-TFT)
and other strict (tolerant) strategies and/or responses to prevent the oppo-
nent from exploiting and to reach and to keep mutual cooperation.
Thus, an effective strategy to reach and keep mutual cooperation reduces
the number of alternatives in the stage game and utilizes the strategies
that give the opponent the incentive to cooperate. We call this strategy
Cooperation Facilitation Strategy in the Multi-Game Contact (CFSMGC).
In this experiment, Soft-TFT and a part of Hard-TFT cluster satisfy
the condition of CFSMGC. The former has the major strategy, that is, Soft-
TFT, and the minor and strict strategies and responses such as Hard-TFT
and PD. The latter has the major strategy, that is, Hard-TFT, and the
minor and tolerant strategies such and responses as UC and/or Soft-TFT.
These clusters reduce the number of subjective information sets. Soft-TFT
cluster facilitates mutual cooperation obviously. Although those who utilize
Hard-TFT cluster often fail to reach mutual cooperation, some players adopt
the strategies that induce mutual cooperation. Therefore, they belongs to
the players who use CFSMGC.
5 Interpretation
Since TFT focuses on information sets in only the last round, it decreases
the cognitive cost of a player, which is considered when a player try to un-
derstand the meaning of opponent’s decision. On the other hand, a strategy
in the repeated game is a list of alternatives in all the past and future infor-
mation sets. The content of the list increases exponentially as the number
of rounds increases since the increase in the number of the information sets
that the player care is exponential. Soft-TFT and Hard-TFT returns only all
cooperation or deviation in the present round. For the players, cooperation
in one game and deviation in the other game has the same meaning as co-
operation (Soft-TFT) or deviation (Hard-TFT) in all the games. Therefore,
these are simple.12
Moreover, they reduce the opponent’s cognitive cost since they have only
12A reader may assume another TFT, which returns cooperation in all the games when
the opponent’s last choice of a particular game, say game S, was cooperation but does
deviation in all the games when the last choice of the game was deviation. This strategy
only focuses on a game and ignores the other game. It is not Soft-TFT or Hard-TFT.
However, as a consequence of reconsidering our subjects’ behavior, we did not find that
they employed such a strategy. That is, they did not attatch a high value to a particular
game.
16
two alternatives to respond. They are very useful tool for sending a player’s
cooperative message to the opponent. On the other hand, since Sept-TFT
mimics only the opponent’s choices, the subjects need not deliberate the
opponent’s decision. However, they use all the alternatives. In this sense, it
does not reduce the opponent’s cognitive cost. It is not useful when sending
a player’s message to the opponent.
Using Soft-TFT and Hard-TFT suggests the existence of “subjective in-
formation set”. It is an information set that a subject actually considers
when she choose the present alternatives.13 Subjective information set is
more strategic than an information set. A player thinks that some informa-
tion sets are indifferent for her present decision making. She can decide the
number of subjective information sets strategically in her favor. It does not
decrease the number of information sets in the stage game. Subjective ones
give information sets some interpretation (figure ??). In the left table in
this figure, a subject interprets that three of four information sets have the
same meaning for her decision making (Soft-TFT). Therefore, a Soft-TFT
player plays the multi-game contact with two subjective information sets.
In the right table, she interprets that all the information sets differ from
each other for her decision making (Sept-TFT). A Sept-TFT player plays
the multi-game contact with four subjective information sets.
Assuming that a player uses subjective information sets, the number of
the sets will affect the cognitive cost. When the number increases, the cost
will also increase. The cognitive cost reduction is required for players.
In every round, Soft-TFT or Hard-TFT players can reduce such costs
since they classify the opponent’s asymmetrical alternatives into coopera-
tion or deviation. This is a simple classification. In reality, since asymmetric
alternatives is not cooperation or deviation, they are ambiguous. However,
they classify such ones into two categories arbitrarily. Based on this classi-
fication, they cooperate (deviate) in all the games for the opponent’s coop-
eration (deviation). In the point that they do not examine their opponent’s
strategy carefully, they are lazy.
However, their laziness makes two TFT strategies an useful tool for mu-
tual cooperation. Whatever alternatives the opponent chooses, the players
return clear response. This makes it easy to inform the opponent of their
attitude; when they employ Soft-TFT (Hard-TFT), their attitude is toler-
ant (severe).14 At the same time, these strategies change the number of the
13A information set explained in the textbook of game theory is given objectively and
players in the game cannot change it arbitrarily.
14Since Hard-TFT deviates against the opponent’s ambiguous alternatives, the oppo-
nent may regard it as exploitation. This is one of the reasons why Hard-based cluster
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opponent’s subjective information sets into two. This change enables the
opponent to play the games with two TFT strategies.
Thus, there are two ways of cognitive cost reduction.;first, adoption of
TFT dramatically decreases the number of infomation sets that players take
into account. Second, adoption of Soft-TFT or Hard-TFT bring together
the opponent’s ambiguous alternatives into cooperation or deviation as a
subjective information set. Soft-TFT or Hard-TFT players reduce the cost
by reducing the number of subjective ones.
Moreover, experimental analysis indicates that Soft-TFT players also
utilize Hard-TFT and that Hard-TFT players who successfully reach mutual
cooperation also utilize UC or Soft-TFT. These clusters have cooperation
facilitation and exploitation prevention with simple combination of strate-
gies. Such CFSMGC is generated unintentionally by the players who want
to cut cognitive cost.
6 Discussion
Let us discuss CFSMGC from various viewpoints. Prior experimental stud-
ies basically found that multimarket contact facilitated cooperation. This
is different from our result. However, the result is natural if most of the
subjects in the prior studies offer alternatives on the lines of ‘CFSMGC’.
We investigate the human behavior on which the prior experiments did not
focus and find a valuable strategy to facilitate mutual cooperation in reality.
This point distinguishes our study from the prior experimental studies.
Experimental result indicates that TFT strategies with another strate-
gies will induce mutual cooperation. However, we can look for another CF-
SMGC if the subjects utilize all-C or Trigger strategy. Thus, there will be
another CFSMGC. However, all-C is weak against exploitation and Trigger
is not adaptively helpful for mutual cooperation.
The limitation of CFSMGC is clear when we consider that players re-
peatedly play multiple ultimatum games, trust games, and snatch games.
In these games, the second mover takes advantage against the first mover.
Therefore, the first mover can not utilize CFSMGC as the punishment
scheme in these games. That is, CFSMGC does not facilitate mutual co-
operation in some repeated play extensive form games, although CFSMGC
facilitates mutual cooperation in the normal form games. Another strategy
is required for mutual cooperation in the repeated extensive form games.
subjects often fail to reach mutual cooperation.
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Let us discuss the relationship between Fehr-Schmidt utility function [11]
and CFSMGC from the viewpoint of cooperation facilitation device. Since
Fehr-Schmidt utility function contains inequality aversion, the player who
has this function prefers to be in the same situation as her opponent. On
the other hand, CFSMGC does not have such an aversion. It does not
avoid the asymmetric situation. Rather, for long-term mutual cooperation,
it admits short-term inequality.15 Moreover, although Fehr-Schmidt utility
function focuses on the one-round decision making such as Ultimatum game,
CFSMGC focuses on the long-run decision making in repeatedly played
multiple games. We think that Fehr-Schmidt utility function is suitable
for the explanation of cooperation in the one-shot game and that CFSMGC
is suitable for the reason why people cooperate in the long run.
Social psychology has the goal/expectation theory [22], which contrives
the conditions for reaching mutual cooperation in a repeated PD game. In
our experiments, most of the opponents of the subjects with high percent
cooperation have also high percent cooperation. This makes it clear that the
subjects in the multi-game contact aim to reach mutual cooperation by trial
and error. However, mutual cooperation is more difficult in the multi-game
contact than in a repeated PD game. If they act following to the theory in
former situation, CFSMGC will be one of possible strategies.
Moreover, CFSMGC has relation with GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation
in Tension Reduction) strategy [18] proposed by Osgood in the middle of
the cold war era. It is a gradual de-escalation process in which one side
makes a unilateral compromise with the hope that the opponent will do the
same.16 It takes in an effective reaction against a unilateral exploitation
by the opponent. He thought that it was useful for mutual cooperation.
Since it was propounded before game theory was not developed, he did not
mention the relationship between game theory and GRIT. CFSMGC is one
of the suitable strategies to set up GRIT, because there are a lot of multi-
game contacts even in the bilateral political relation such as economic and
military issues. For mutual cooperation, the parties hereto are required to
use CFSMGC.
Lastly, our study lacks the severe control of discount factor. As noted
earlier, the severe control make it practically impossible to observe the long-
run behavior in the experiment. We might not find the strategy which
facilitates mutual cooperation. Decision making in the real world scarcely
15If mutual cooperation in all the games is attained by Sept-TFT (which responds to
the opponent’s last choices), the result can be explained by Fehr-Schmidt utility function.
16http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/glossary.htm
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considers the possibility of the termination of a game. When people form
relationships with their colleagues at the office and in private, they do not
always take account of the future termination possibility of the relationships;
they are not aware of the discount factor, or even if they are aware, their
discount factor will be high enough. Since our study focuses on such a
long run behavior in the multi-game contact, the severe control of discount
factor is far from our present interest. However, in order to validate the
multimarket contact theory, we need control the discount factor as [5] did.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper experimentally investigates the percentage of cooperation differ-
ence among treatments in the long run multi (single)-game contact. Com-
parison results show that the number of information sets and the payoff
structure affect the percentage of cooperation contrary to the theoretical
prediction. Then we define seven strategies including three TFT strategies
for cluster analysis. The result indicates that the subjects adopt ‘CFSMGC’
that consists of Soft-TFT or Hard-TFT for mutual cooperation. CFSMGC
is a reasonable strategy that brings mutual cooperation in the multi-game
contact. Utilizing it, the number of alternatives decreases and helps sub-
jects to avoid to offer complicated ones, and then, prevention against the
opponent’s exploitation enables them to reach mutual cooperation.
We remain the multimarket contact experiments with discount factor
control and the experiments in which the payoff of a game is much larger
than that of the other game. They enable us to validate the multimarket
contact theory and to clarify the behavioral property in this situation.
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Figure 1: Experimental Design
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date treatment # of subjects # of rounds reward (ave., JPY)
2005.6.1 T 26 123 3,552
2005.6.4 ST 22 123 3,211
2005.7.6 T 16 116 3,836
2005.7.9 ST 18 116 3,712
2005.10.12 TT 18 96 3,972
2005.10.15 TTT 18 78 3,959
2006.3.3 S 14 83 3,936
2006.3.4 TT 16 84 3,565
2006.6.7 S 18 88 3,385
2006.6.10 ST’ 26 92 3,066
2006.11.22 TT 22 91 3,532
2006.11.25 TTT 12 83 3,037
Table 5: Treatment Profile


















S 0.7625 0.7000 0.6875 0.7063 0.7313 0.7438 0.7656 0.7625 0.7292 
T 0.5548 0.6119 0.6929 0.7452 0.6690 0.6452 0.6667 0.7333 0.7738 0.7357 0.6833 0.6667 
TT 0.5429 0.5339 0.5848 0.6036 0.6161 0.6804 0.6982 0.6732 0.6779 
ST 0.4900 0.4750 0.4688 0.5875 0.6575 0.6088 0.6288 0.6813 0.7100 0.7138 0.7150 0.7063 
TT' 0.4096 0.4385 0.5269 0.4865 0.5019 0.4904 0.4692 0.5481 0.5308 
TTT 0.4400 0.5100 0.5133 0.5378 0.4989 0.5244 0.4856 0.5000 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Figure 2: The evolution of the percent cooperation (per ten rounds)
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CD DC Sept-TFT (TT)/ PD
CD CC Soft-TFT
DC DD Hard-TFT







Table 6: Strategy and response in 2 games; TFT depends on what kind of
TFT strategies a subject employed in the most recent round.

















Table 7: Strategy and response in 3 games; TFT depends on what kind of
TFT strategies a subject employed in the most recent round.
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t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Player 1 Game T-1 D C C C C
Game T-2 D D D C C
Player 2 Game T-1 C C C C C
Game T-2 D C C C C
Player 1’s Strategy - Sept-TFT PD Sept-TFT Sept-TFT
Player 2’s Strategy - UC Soft-TFT Soft-TFT Soft-TFT
Table 8: Classification example: Treatment TT, Subject No.12, 12.10.2005
Game all rounds first half second half 78 first 39 rounds second 39 rounds
S (83) 0.7323 0.7150 0.7500 0.7316 0.7147 0.7484
T (116) 0.6821 0.6531 0.7110 0.6630 0.6484 0.6777
TT (84) 0.6194 0.5699 0.6688 0.6161 0.5646 0.6676
ST (116) 0.6172 0.5450 0.6894 0.5726 0.5010 0.6442
TT’ (92) 0.4887 0.4707 0.5067 0.4820 0.4655 0.4985
TTT (78) 0.5013 0.5000 0.5026 0.5013 0.5000 0.5026
Table 9: The percentage of cooperation in multi-game contact treatments,
it is the average among all the games.
variable C.V. D.F variance F-value Pr (>F)
round (1− 78) 0.807 77 0.010 3.278 1.52E-14
treatment 3.570 5 0.714 223.451 2E-111
round (1− 39) 0.306 38 0.008 2.419 4.88E-05
treatment 1.856 5 0.371 111.489 1.43E-54
round (40− 78) 0.114 38 0.003 1.800 0.006
treatment 1.995 5 0.399 239.435 5.44E-80
Table 10: ANOVA result
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CD (CCD) DC (DCC) CD or DC
All Players First Second First Second First Second
TT 0.1021 0.0801 0.0655 0.0664 0.0838 0.0733
TTT 0.0812 0.0291 ∗∗∗ 0.1485 0.0573 ∗∗∗ 0.2297 0.0863 ∗∗∗
TT’ 0.0779 0.0414∗∗ 0.1036 0.0404∗∗∗
ST 0.1192 0.0801 ∗∗∗ 0.0583 0.0340 ∗∗∗
Cooperators First Second First Second First Second
TT 0.0301 0.0167 0.0067 0.0089 0.0188 0.0131
TTT 0.0284 0.0303 0.0380 0.0186∗ 0.0286 0.0245
TT’ 0.0103 0.0000 0.0385 0.0026∗∗
ST 0.0723 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0186 0.0000∗∗∗
Table 11: Elinimation of asymmetric information sets in 78 rounds:∗, ∗∗ and
∗ ∗ ∗ indicate the significant difference in 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level,
respectively.
TT SOFT HARD SEPT UC UD PC PD # SUBJECTS # COOPERATORS
TFT 0.921 0.920 0.918 0.037 0.026 0.009 0.005 14 11
SOFT-TFT 0.846 0.128 0.153 0.014 0.019 0.022 0.020 8 7
HARD-TFT 0.091 0.823 0.102 0.016 0.052 0.036 0.013 9 2
SEPT-TFT 0.039 0.229 0.532 0.017 0.030 0.140 0.036 12 1
OTHERS 0.274 0.252 0.239 0.060 0.052 0.092 0.055 12 2
TTT SOFT HARD SEPT UC UD PC PD # SUBJECTS # COOPERATORS
TFT 0.929 0.905 0.920 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.011 7 6
SOFT-TFT 0.742 0.097 0.100 0.019 0.019 0.065 0.022 6 4
HARD-TFT 0.038 0.753 0.086 0.022 0.035 0.055 0.033 11 1
SEPT-TFT 0.060 0.145 0.621 0.008 0.000 0.117 0.075 5 0
OTHERS 0.519 0.519 0.519 0.156 0.000 0.325 0.000 1 0
TT’ SOFT HARD SEPT UC UD PC PD # SUBJECTS # COOPERATORS
SOFT-TFT 0.968 0.055 0.068 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.003 4 4
HARD-TFT 0.079 0.749 0.091 0.014 0.016 0.051 0.023 10 1
SEPT-TFT 0.552 0.634 0.855 0.011 0.013 0.035 0.004 6 5
OTHERS1 0.199 0.351 0.316 0.039 0.013 0.108 0.087 3 0
OTHERS2 0.143 0.268 0.087 0.091 0.130 0.139 0.143 3 0
ST SOFT HARD SEPT UC UD PC PD # SUBJECTS # COOPERATORS
TFT 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 7 5
SOFT-TFT 0.840 0.074 0.030 0.043 0.004 0.013 0.017 6 5
HARD-TFT 0.106 0.827 0.139 0.029 0.017 0.030 0.021 12 5
SEPT-TFT 0.169 0.193 0.657 0.009 0.054 0.067 0.056 7 0
OTHERS 0.157 0.302 0.179 0.024 0.029 0.175 0.156 8 0
Table 12: Cluster analysis result
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Treatment # of Soft type players percent cooperation Significance (one tailed test)
TT 9 0.886 1 %
TTT 6 0.773 5 %
TT’ 4 0.928 1 %
ST 6 0.890 5 %
Table 13: The statistical difference of the cooparation rate between in the
multi -game contact (with Soft-TFT players) and in the single game T
Subjective information set
Information set in the last round Soft type Hard type Separate type
CC SIS 1 SIS 1
CD SIS 1 SIS 2
DC SIS 2 SIS 3
DD SIS 2 SIS 4
Table 14: Subjective redcution of an information set
28
Table 15: Decision distribution and the percentage of cooperation in TT
Date Game No T-TFT R-TFT S-TFT UC UD PC PD % of coop. CULSTER
304 TT 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
304 TT 2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
304 TT 3 0.818 0.143 0.104 0.013 0.026 0.013 0.013 0.814 SOFT-TFT
304 TT 4 0.857 0.065 0.117 0.000 0.013 0.078 0.000 0.846 SOFT-TFT
304 TT 5 0.143 0.597 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.244 HARD-TFT
304 TT 6 0.013 0.247 0.377 0.000 0.013 0.273 0.104 0.288 SEPT-TFT
304 TT 7 0.039 0.234 0.649 0.065 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.122 SEPT-TFT
304 TT 8 0.195 0.831 0.208 0.000 0.065 0.052 0.039 0.051 HARD-TFT
304 TT 9 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.052 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.936 TFT
304 TT 10 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.949 TFT
304 TT 11 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
304 TT 12 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
304 TT 13 0.961 0.948 0.935 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.981 TFT
304 TT 14 0.935 0.922 0.922 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.039 0.968 TFT
304 TT 15 0.429 0.000 0.519 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.859 OTHERS
304 TT 16 0.455 0.325 0.026 0.000 0.104 0.065 0.078 0.744 OTHERS
1012 TT 1 0.182 0.182 0.312 0.013 0.039 0.104 0.221 0.391 OTHERS
1012 TT 2 0.299 0.195 0.299 0.052 0.026 0.091 0.065 0.468 OTHERS
1012 TT 3 0.091 0.792 0.117 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.000 0.115 HARD-TFT
1012 TT 4 0.000 0.429 0.260 0.013 0.026 0.234 0.039 0.179 SEPT-TFT
1012 TT 5 0.026 0.091 0.662 0.000 0.013 0.104 0.104 0.391 SEPT-TFT
1012 TT 6 0.104 0.286 0.390 0.039 0.026 0.130 0.026 0.423 SEPT-TFT
1012 TT 7 0.078 0.221 0.351 0.026 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.333 SEPT-TFT
1012 TT 8 0.013 0.429 0.429 0.000 0.052 0.091 0.013 0.186 SEPT-TFT
1012 TT 9 0.195 0.260 0.065 0.091 0.104 0.182 0.104 0.410 OTHERS
1012 TT 10 0.273 0.390 0.130 0.026 0.078 0.065 0.039 0.372 OTHERS
1012 TT 11 0.026 0.026 0.805 0.013 0.013 0.091 0.026 0.571 SEPT-TFT
1012 TT 12 0.481 0.156 0.247 0.026 0.039 0.052 0.000 0.545 OTHERS
1012 TT 13 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.994 TFT
1012 TT 14 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.987 SOFT-TFT
1012 TT 15 0.909 0.221 0.169 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.949 SOFT-TFT
1012 TT 16 0.169 0.948 0.169 0.000 0.013 0.026 0.013 0.929 HARD-TFT
1012 TT 17 0.169 0.338 0.247 0.143 0.026 0.078 0.026 0.436 OTHERS
1012 TT 18 0.052 0.390 0.169 0.039 0.143 0.169 0.091 0.327 OTHERS
1122 TT 1 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.143 0.052 0.130 0.000 0.205 TFT
1122 TT 2 0.026 0.818 0.026 0.039 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.051 HARD-TFT
1122 TT 3 0.013 0.013 0.909 0.026 0.000 0.052 0.013 0.955 SEPT-TFT
1122 TT 4 0.896 0.039 0.013 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.013 0.910 SOFT-TFT
1122 TT 5 0.000 0.948 0.000 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.968 HARD-TFT
1122 TT 6 0.974 0.156 0.156 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.968 SOFT-TFT
1122 TT 7 0.779 0.442 0.468 0.013 0.052 0.000 0.130 0.840 SOFT-TFT
1122 TT 8 0.636 0.000 0.247 0.078 0.026 0.000 0.013 0.917 SOFT-TFT
1122 TT 9 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
1122 TT 10 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
1122 TT 11 0.701 0.714 0.701 0.195 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.410 TFT
1122 TT 12 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.065 0.156 0.000 0.013 0.314 TFT
1122 TT 13 0.065 0.338 0.455 0.000 0.065 0.169 0.039 0.314 SEPT-TFT
1122 TT 14 0.221 0.234 0.403 0.065 0.026 0.065 0.013 0.378 OTHERS
1122 TT 15 0.013 0.182 0.766 0.000 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.692 SEPT-TFT
1122 TT 16 0.740 0.091 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.744 SOFT-TFT
1122 TT 17 0.117 0.870 0.065 0.026 0.039 0.013 0.000 0.699 HARD-TFT
1122 TT 18 0.052 0.935 0.052 0.026 0.013 0.026 0.000 0.718 HARD-TFT
1122 TT 19 0.182 0.234 0.273 0.052 0.026 0.208 0.026 0.417 OTHERS
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1122 TT 20 0.078 0.260 0.338 0.026 0.130 0.182 0.065 0.321 SEPT-TFT
1122 TT 21 0.351 0.325 0.182 0.156 0.013 0.026 0.000 0.513 OTHERS
1122 TT 22 0.026 0.662 0.039 0.013 0.169 0.091 0.052 0.359 HARD-TFT
Table 16: Decision distribution and the percentage of cooperation in TT’
Date Game No T-TFT R-TFT S-TFT UC UD PC PD % of coop. cluster
1022 TT’ 1 0.117 0.117 0.987 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.833 SEP-TFT
1022 TT’ 2 0.961 0.130 0.143 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.859 SOFT-TFT
1022 TT’ 3 0.026 0.831 0.065 0.000 0.026 0.091 0.013 0.071 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 4 0.052 0.714 0.156 0.013 0.000 0.052 0.013 0.096 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 5 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 SOFT-TFT
1022 TT’ 6 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.994 SEP-TFT
1022 TT’ 7 0.935 0.052 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.910 SOFT-TFT
1022 TT’ 8 0.052 0.052 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.897 SEP-TFT
1022 TT’ 9 0.013 0.662 0.286 0.000 0.026 0.039 0.000 0.026 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 10 0.455 0.506 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.038 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 11 0.091 0.494 0.065 0.039 0.039 0.182 0.091 0.282 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 12 0.156 0.221 0.312 0.026 0.000 0.156 0.130 0.314 OTHERS1
1022 TT’ 13 0.429 0.416 0.247 0.091 0.026 0.039 0.065 0.692 OTHERS1
1022 TT’ 14 0.130 0.351 0.039 0.078 0.182 0.104 0.117 0.603 OTHERS2
1022 TT’ 15 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.039 0.065 0.026 0.000 0.788 SEP-TFT
1022 TT’ 16 0.039 0.909 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.808 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 17 0.039 0.649 0.169 0.013 0.000 0.039 0.091 0.167 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 18 0.013 0.416 0.390 0.000 0.013 0.130 0.065 0.192 OTHERS1
1022 TT’ 19 0.468 0.961 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.013 0.929 SEP-TFT
1022 TT’ 20 0.974 0.039 0.039 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.942 SOFT-TFT
1022 TT’ 21 0.000 0.883 0.039 0.000 0.026 0.039 0.013 0.045 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 22 0.052 0.896 0.078 0.013 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.071 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 23 0.195 0.247 0.117 0.052 0.143 0.104 0.143 0.378 OTHERS2
1022 TT’ 24 0.104 0.208 0.104 0.143 0.065 0.208 0.169 0.462 OTHERS2
1022 TT’ 25 0.026 0.948 0.026 0.013 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.013 HARD-TFT
1022 TT’ 26 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.026 0.000 0.156 0.013 0.122 SEP-TFT
Table 17: Decision distribution and the percentage of cooperation in TTT
Date Game No T-TFT R-TFT S-TFT UC UD PC PD % of coop. cluster
1015 TTT 1 0.000 0.883 0.013 0.000 0.078 0.013 0.013 0.034 HARD-TFT
1015 TTT 2 0.026 0.805 0.065 0.039 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.124 HARD-TFT
1015 TTT 3 0.636 0.169 0.247 0.013 0.039 0.117 0.013 0.641 SOFT-TFT
1015 TTT 4 0.091 0.182 0.675 0.026 0.000 0.013 0.039 0.641 SEPT-TFT
1015 TTT 5 0.000 0.857 0.117 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.380 HARD-TFT
1015 TTT 6 0.013 0.026 0.935 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.013 0.402 SEPT-TFT
1015 TTT 7 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
1015 TTT 8 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
1015 TTT 9 0.013 0.714 0.156 0.000 0.013 0.078 0.052 0.124 HARD-TFT
1015 TTT 10 0.078 0.026 0.831 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.039 0.145 SEPT-TFT
1015 TTT 11 0.026 0.273 0.325 0.000 0.000 0.260 0.143 0.329 SEPT-TFT
1015 TTT 12 0.091 0.221 0.338 0.013 0.000 0.247 0.143 0.355 SEPT-TFT
1015 TTT 13 0.818 0.104 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.731 SOFT-TFT
1015 TTT 14 0.701 0.078 0.130 0.013 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.761 SOFT-TFT
1015 TTT 15 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
1015 TTT 16 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
1015 TTT 17 0.857 0.688 0.636 0.052 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.915 TFT
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1015 TTT 18 0.727 0.727 0.883 0.000 0.039 0.026 0.052 0.872 TFT
1125 TTT 1 0.701 0.026 0.000 0.039 0.026 0.143 0.065 0.821 SOFT-TFT
1125 TTT 2 0.675 0.143 0.104 0.013 0.026 0.013 0.026 0.769 SOFT-TFT
1125 TTT 3 0.039 0.494 0.286 0.026 0.000 0.091 0.065 0.175 HARD-TFT
1125 TTT 4 0.013 0.675 0.078 0.026 0.052 0.130 0.026 0.145 HARD-TFT
1125 TTT 5 0.922 0.065 0.065 0.039 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.915 SOFT-TFT
1125 TTT 6 0.078 0.909 0.078 0.013 0.026 0.013 0.039 0.868 HARD-TFT
1125 TTT 7 0.195 0.597 0.091 0.013 0.000 0.039 0.065 0.222 HARD-TFT
1125 TTT 8 0.026 0.623 0.052 0.052 0.065 0.117 0.091 0.201 HARD-TFT
1125 TTT 9 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.000 0.039 0.013 0.026 0.043 TFT
1125 TTT 10 0.013 0.909 0.000 0.065 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.090 HARD-TFT
1125 TTT 11 0.519 0.519 0.519 0.156 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.325 OTHERS
1125 TTT 12 0.013 0.818 0.013 0.000 0.143 0.039 0.000 0.013 HARD-TFT
Table 18: Decision distribution and the percentage of cooperation in ST
Date Game No Soft-TFT Hard-TFT Sep-TFT UC UD PC PD % of coop. cluster
604 ST 1 0.117 0.013 0.688 0.013 0.065 0.013 0.091 0.609 SEP-TFT
604 ST 2 0.584 0.221 0.117 0.104 0.013 0.026 0.013 0.686 SOFT-TFT
604 ST 3 0.338 0.870 0.260 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.955 HARD-TFT
604 ST 4 0.234 0.922 0.234 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.039 0.942 HARD-TFT
604 ST 5 0.026 0.312 0.532 0.013 0.026 0.130 0.013 0.135 SEP-TFT
604 ST 6 0.013 0.701 0.130 0.039 0.039 0.052 0.026 0.103 HARD-TFT
604 ST 7 0.273 0.286 0.208 0.013 0.013 0.104 0.104 0.429 OTHERS
604 ST 8 0.234 0.299 0.104 0.026 0.052 0.234 0.078 0.455 OTHERS
604 ST 9 0.130 0.649 0.208 0.052 0.026 0.026 0.013 0.724 HARD-TFT
604 ST 10 0.221 0.104 0.636 0.000 0.039 0.078 0.052 0.705 SEP-TFT
604 ST 11 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.974 HARD-TFT
604 ST 12 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.981 TFT
604 ST 13 0.390 0.571 0.688 0.013 0.039 0.052 0.026 0.103 SEP-TFT
604 ST 14 0.442 0.818 0.558 0.013 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.122 HARD-TFT
604 ST 15 0.000 0.935 0.000 0.013 0.026 0.026 0.000 0.026 HARD-TFT
604 ST 16 0.065 0.078 0.883 0.026 0.013 0.065 0.000 0.071 SEP-TFT
604 ST 17 0.143 0.195 0.208 0.052 0.039 0.091 0.273 0.429 OTHERS
604 ST 18 0.091 0.195 0.182 0.000 0.026 0.221 0.286 0.429 OTHERS
604 ST 19 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.994 TFT
604 ST 20 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 SOFT-TFT
604 ST 21 0.221 0.468 0.208 0.052 0.052 0.117 0.013 0.314 OTHERS
604 ST 22 0.273 0.182 0.416 0.000 0.065 0.104 0.117 0.263 SEP-TFT
709 ST 1 0.844 0.052 0.052 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.026 0.891 SOFT-TFT
709 ST 2 0.883 0.052 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.052 0.891 SOFT-TFT
709 ST 3 0.013 0.429 0.130 0.013 0.039 0.156 0.221 0.269 OTHERS
709 ST 4 0.078 0.208 0.169 0.039 0.000 0.338 0.169 0.436 OTHERS
709 ST 5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
709 ST 6 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 TFT
709 ST 7 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 TFT
709 ST 8 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.013 TFT
709 ST 9 0.026 0.974 0.026 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.596 HARD-TFT
709 ST 10 0.000 0.909 0.000 0.039 0.013 0.039 0.000 0.622 HARD-TFT
709 ST 11 0.078 0.779 0.065 0.026 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.782 HARD-TFT
709 ST 12 0.013 0.753 0.026 0.052 0.065 0.052 0.039 0.750 HARD-TFT
709 ST 13 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.994 TFT
709 ST 14 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 SOFT-TFT
709 ST 15 0.000 0.623 0.156 0.052 0.000 0.078 0.091 0.308 HARD-TFT
709 ST 16 0.208 0.338 0.221 0.000 0.013 0.143 0.104 0.295 OTHERS
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709 ST 17 0.727 0.117 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.872 SOFT-TFT
709 ST 18 0.091 0.091 0.753 0.000 0.130 0.026 0.091 0.712 SEP-TFT
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